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The aim of relation is relation's own being, that is, 
contact with the Thou. For through contact with every 
thou we are stirred with a breath of the Thou, that is, 
of eternal life. 1 
- Martin Buber 
To enter into relation with another individual, to estab­
lish an 1/existence-communication" where fundamental ethical 
demands are experienced directly - the twentieth-century 
Jewish theologian Martin Buber saw the reality of this relation 
to the Thou as mediating access to /Ieternal life." And the I aim', 
the authentic telos of this relationship with the other, Buber 
urged, rests simply in establishing relationship itself, in achiev­
ing genuine I contact' with another independent, existing per­
son. 
, The emphasis in Bubel" s existentialist thought on the 
ethical primacy of an I-Thou relation is anticipated, as is well­
acknowledged, by seminal insights from within the large, 
literary corpus of S0ren Kierkegaard. For the Danish Lutheran 
Kierkegaard, the basic concern of this ethical relation with the 
Thou finds its most paradigmatic expression in the existing 
human's relationship to the absolute 'Other.' Itisarelationship 
which is grounded in - language suggestively evoked in 
Buber's later formulations - in the infinite interest in one's 
"eternal happiness." And this "relation of the subject [to God] 
is precisely the knotty subject," a concenl of central importance 
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within Kierkegaard's philosophy,2 
What is at stake here? Why does this subjective relation­
ship of the existing individual to her eternal happiness, this 
"God-relationship," constitute, for Kierkegaard, the knotty 
subject? Understood properly, it is just this dilemma which 
confronts each person as an existing individual. It was this 
overarching concern which bore a foundational bearing for his 
entire thinking, and indeed, for his own life: 
. , , what good would it do me to be able to explain the 
meaning of Christianity if it had no deeper signifi­
cance forme and for my life; - whatgood would it dp 
me if truth stood before me, cold and naked, not 
caring whether I recognized her or not, and produc­
ing in me a shudder of fear rather than a trusting 
devotion? I certainly do not deny that I still recognise 
an imperative of understanding and that through it 
one can work upon men, but itmust be taken up into 
my life, and that is what I now recognise as the most 
important thing.3 
The 'imperative' llr.trure derives from its intellectual, and 
lnore decisively, from its existential claims upon the person's 
life, as she lives it; its difficulty rests in the manner inwhich we 
rela te to the truth. 
Before tackling the 'knotty subject' of the believer's 
existential stance, we need to underscore a basic condition for 
any truth-relationship at alL It is the concern that opens the 
pseudonym Johannps Climacus' first work, Philosophical Frag­
ments - namely, "Can the truth be learned?" Can we even 
acquire Kierkegaard's "imperative of understanding" at all, 
not only to 'work upon' others, but to take up truth in our own 
individual lives? Instead of engaging in a predominant ap­
proach in formulating this issue - by concentrating on 
Kierkegaard's celebrated thesis that "truth is subjectivity," that' 
knowledge of truth is obtained via some existential, subjective 
mode of inquiry - we want to retrieve here what seems an 
almost entirely neglected element in most expositions on his 
3 RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN FINITUDE 
philosophy: a full description of Kierkegaard' s essentially nega­
tive response to the question. 
Thatis, we want to outline those conditions and features 
inherent inthehumanpredicamentthat atleastfor Kierkegaard, 
present themselves as barriers, or perhaps better, as inevitable 
limitations or horizons to human attempts at knowing. And in 
this respect, we want to secure for Kierkegaard an anticipatory 
status not only as a proto-deconstructionist, as scholars as 
diverse as Louis Mackey, Mark Taylor and others have vari­
ously suggested, but also, and perhaps more calmly, as an 
important proto-hermeneutical thinker - as anticipating stances 
maturely formulated in later Continental philosophers such as 
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and others. We 
want to establish what Kierkegaard sees as the situated contin­
gency and 'fallibilistic' status intrinsic in any human knowl­
edge. 
Drawing particularly from the hallmark writings of the 
pseudonymous Johannes Climacus, we will try to piece to­
gether an organized view of how Kierkegaard would urge us to 
understand that most elevated project of human knowledge 
that is, metaphysical speculation, this theoretical explanation 
into the way things are.4 It was the urgent need for delimiting 
this tendency in "the present age" towards totalizing system­
building which provoked Kierkegaard into enlisting the talents 
of a dialectician like Johannes Climacus. The well-known his­
torical outcome of this maneuver was an elaborate, existential 
defense of a thoroughly more tempered view of human know­
ing, working towards a hermeneutical 'reconstruction' of hu­
man finitude, and of the radical contingency of human knowl­
edge and historical existence itself. 
A Pseudonymous Perspective on the Metaphysical Project 
Employing for his own particular purposes an insight 
derived from Lessing, JohalUles Climacus endorses the thesis 
that /I a system of existence cannot be given. 115 For Climacus, so­
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called systems of existence, necessarily arising from an essen­
tially detached vie"wpoint, are fundamentally contrary to the 
nature of human existence itself. Kierkegaard's distinctive 
formulations about "metaphysics" are fueled by exactly anti­
Hegelian concerns of this sort, by whatJohannes Climacus and 
other pseudonyms considered as fundamental shortcomings 
in any metaphysical project. 
What best characterizes metaphysics, and the way in 
'which speculative thought conceives of existence? It is pre­
eminently a desire to understand one's existence sub specie 
aeterni,6 the attempt to conjoin in human systems thought and 
existence, ideality and actuality. This attitude fosters a "meta­
physical withdrawal,"7 which always remains an existential 
impossibility because it requires an abstraction out of exist­
ence itself. As Climacus puts it, "The systematic idea is subject­
object, is the unity of thinking and being; existence, on the 
other hand, is precisely the separation."sTo locate Kierkegaard's 
insight in more familiar, philosophical environs, metaphysical 
systematization is preeminently that sort of thinking which 
Hilary Putnam would indict as being a wistful, realist longing 
for a God's-eye perspective, an 'externalistic' all-encompass­
ingviewpoint from which to definitively understand the whole 
of reality.9 
Johannes Climacus sets a fundamental opposition in 
motion here. On the one hand, we can embrace the deliver­
ances of a theoretical metaphysics; on the other, we are con­
fronted with existence itself, with the actuality of living one's 
own life. This same dilemma faced another Kierkegaard 
pseudonym, Constantin Constatius, in Repetition.10 There, the 
issue was whether movement in the "existential" sense was 
possible, and Constantius set the stage with a classical dispute 
between the Eleatics, who theoretically denied motion, and 
Diogenes, who came forward to refute them. "He literally did 
come forward, because he did notsay a word but merely paced 
pack and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had 
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sufficiently refuted them."ll 
Metaphysical speculation, like the Eleatic denial of real 
motion, is always on the side of theoretically 'freezing' actual­
ity, of trying to rarefy the constant flux of human existence into 
permanent, immobilized systems. Instead of movement for­
ward, instead of genuine existential repetition, speculative 
thought feigns motion through a recollection (in a Socratic 
fashion) of systematic knowledge which one has, in fact, al­
ways imamnently possessed. 
Johannes Climacus affirms a related doctrine. Rather 
than stress on 'repetition' for acquiring existential knowledge, 
the arguments in the Postscript instead emphasize the ethical 
category. It is in the ethical- which, on at least one possible 
characterization, is where an individual moves beyond pure 
immediacy, and the multiplicities of options given by reflec­
tion, to that place where one relates in a committed sense of 
subjectivity - in which we encounter the difficulty of actual 
existence. Climacus writes: 
The continued striving is the expression of the exist­
ing subject's ethical life view. The continued striving 
must therefore not be understood metaphysically, 
but neither is there any individual who exists meta­
physically.J2 
This "continued striving," which, in apostolic Pauline 
language, is familiarly expressed as a pressing on to that goal 
ahead,I3 is eminently the language of achIality, of existential 
movement. And this necessity, Climacus would urge, demon­
strates the incompatibility of living in effortless, speculative 
categories. To reemphasize his insight, "neither is there any 
individual who exists metaphysically." 14 
The project which underlies the project in the Postscript" 
is thus more fundamental in a religious sense. The task is 
ethical and religious existence itself. The goal, the absolute 
telos, resides in one's acquiring of her own infinite, eternal 
happiness. 
To yield to the ethical sphere, through resolving to 
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commit oneself, is to enter into actual existence. Metaphysics, 
on the other hand, would have us to go evenbeyond existence, 
as the term itself could literally be taken to imply, the 'meta-II 
or moving past or beyond, of natural existence itself; to move 
beyond the difficulty which constitutes the task of life. IS This 
recalls Kierkegaard' s repeated illustration of the system-builder 
whomakes for herself a grand castle, and then occupies the hut 
next door, or the comical figure of Johannes Climacus' Herr 
Professor, who, in explaining all of existence, "has in sheer 
absentmindedness forgotten what he himself is called, namely 
thathe is a humanbeing... and not a fantastical three-eighths of 
a paragraph."16 
Kierkegaard's critique of metaphysics, then, is an in­
dictment from an ethical standpoint. It charges the metaphy­
sician with'skipping,' or 'leaping over,' the ethical sphere -­
and with that, existence itself. Either an individual refuses to 
enter into existence, never allowing an aut/aut to even arise in 
one's life. Or one has skipped it, attempting to systematize 
existence when the real task before one is constituted by life 
itself. And a final spatial metaphor, which seems, at least on 
this account, to exhaust metaphysics' possible neglect of exist­
ence, is that the person stands outside of existence altog~~thcr. 
There are two ways in which an existing person can 
be outside of existence, but in neither of these ways 
does he mediate. One way is abstracting himself, by 
going a skeptical impassivity, an abstract indiffer­
ence... The other way inwhich the individual can be 
outside existence is by being in a state of passion, but 
it is the veIY moment of passion that he gains the 
momenhlm to existP 
We deliberately set aside this latter way of how one 'pas­
sionately' proceeds in existence; for present purposes, we want 
to evaluate the radical limitations inherent in the metaphysical 
project, as outlined by Climacus. 
First, the metaphysical viewpoint, by which a person 
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wants to eternally understand the whole of existence, is a 
position sub specie aeterni, where"the truthwouldbe something 
concluded for him."18 liBut where is this point?1J Climacus 
presses. "The I-I is a mathematical point that does not exist at 
all ..."19 It is, quite literally, what Thomas Nagel has aptly 
called, a "view from nowhere."2o 
And second, the role that speculation plays in actual 
human existence must be sharply demarcated. This delimiting 
of 'objective' knowledge will be taken up again in the next 
section. Here we can note how, at least for Climacus, knowl­
edge, by itself, is woefully inadequate. Climacus insists that 
IIthe ethical is not only a knowing; it is also a doing that is related 
to a knowing ..."21 In fact, this ethical dimension can be seen 
as a necessary pre-condition for having any knowledge at all. 
As Climacus suggests, liTo exist subjectively withpassion is on 
the whole an absolute condition for being able to have any 
opinion about Christianity."22 The presence of subjectivity, of 
a passionate interestedness, alters our very epistemological 
capacity to acquire relevant knowledge. 23 
Third, and finally, this theoretical knowledge, divorced 
from the ethical, cannot even be considered to be the highest 
goal for which we should strive:24' 
By acting, by venturing the decisive thing (which 
every human being is capable of doing) in utmost 
subjective passion and in full consciousness of an 
eternal responsibility, one comes to know something 
else, also that to be a human being is something other 
than year in and year out pinning something together 
in a system.25 
Knowledge, apart from abstract knowledge, knowledge 
that focuses onthe individual's own existence, is whatJohannes 
Climacus calls the 'essential truth' for human beings.26 
This last section examines ways in which these limits to 
humanknowledge are made concrete - not through the'supe­
riority' of an ethical actuality (the more 'positive' approach for 
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Kierkegaard), but through the inadequacies inherent in the sort 
of knowledge itself. 
The Undermining of Metaphysics and Human Existence 
A system of existence cannot be given. Is there, then, 
not such a system? That is not the case. Neitheris this 
implied in what has been said. Existence itself is a 
system for God, but it cannot be a system for any 
existing spirit. System and conclusiveness correspond 
to each other, but existence is the very opposite ... 
Existing is the spacing that holds apart; the systematic 
is the conclusiveness that combines,27 
Johannes Climacus' metaphor of 'spacing,' that concept 
which intrinsically "holds apartf/ an otherwise 'conclusive' 
portrait of existence, admits to a decisive gap in any attempt to 
understand humanexistence. A stronger, more explicitly skep­
tical belief bolsters the lack of systematic conclusiveness in this 
picture of human existence. In the fashion of an unrelenting 
Pyrrhonism, Johannes Climacus in the Postscript presses the 
more unsettling contention that "the perpetual process of be­
COIning is the uncertainty of human life, in which everything is 
uncertain. Every human being knows this and says so once in a 
while .. ,"28 All of our attempts at conclusive, speculative 
systems of knowing are fundamentally undermined by the 
nature of human existence itself. 
What are these /I spaces" epistemological, metaphysi­
cal; ethico-religious, and otherwise - which deny actually 
existing persons a complete system of existence? How does 
metaphysical speculation fail to provide a secure base of refer­
ence, an epistemically privileged ground whereby one can 
withstand the radical contingencies of human existence itself? 
We want to single out one aspect in Climacus' account that 
underscores the'negative' features in the humanepistemologi­
cal situation: the inescapable character of /I approximation­
knowledge." 
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In achieving this task, Climacus' project develops in a 
perhaps unexpected way. The conclusion to this polemical 
appraisal of so-called' objective' knowledge, far from yielding 
to an epistemic nihilism, or inducing some sort of Pyrrhonic 
ataraxia, provides, rather, measures for overcoming skepti­
cism. It enables the individual, in some deeply existential 
sense, to engage, and appropriately come to grips with, that 
most paradigmatic philosophically 'modern' aspiration: de 
omnibus dubitandum est [everything must be doubtedJ.29 
To inquire broadly, what role can historical or theoreti­
cal 'objective' demonstration play in the believer's life? What 
constitutes the proper relation between faith and objective 
certitude? And can one ever reach a point of final stopping 
place, where religious certainty is decisively granted? These 
types of questions arise inevitably for Johannes Climacus' 
philosophy whenever anyone tackles the'objective question' 
of Christianity, thatis, whenone inquires into the historical and 
philosophicaltruthwithintheChristianfaith. Wewanttokeep 
in mind two broader concerns. First, what exactly do these 
"objective" trnths establish, if anything, for an individual 
believer? And second, how should we understand the particu­
lar relationship between objective certitude and faith? 
Johannes Climacus' response to these concenlS is dou­
bly negative. That is to say, Climacus repeatedly affirms -in a 
theme which strongly anticipates what in contemporary philo­
sophical circles has been termed a I fallibilist' epistemological 
position-humanfinitude rooted in historicity, a fundamental 
contingency inherent in all potential grounds for 'objective' 
human knowledge.30 What faith demands is certitude, but of a 
categorically different type than what "approximation cer­
tainty of probabilities" can provide. It is an assurance which 
presupposes an infinite interest as its conditio sine qua non, and 
which can only be satisfied by some proportionate means. As 
Climacns states it, only an insecure, embarrassed species of 
faith would seek out the approximation-knowledge of objec­
tive demollstration.31 These objective truths provide only all 
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U approximation-knowledge," aless-than-certain account where 
every future critical deliberation leaves the believer in suspenso, 
forever, while remaining in reflective speculation, deferring 
existential decision. It is a speculative skepticism which para­
lyzes. In Climacus' words, "objectively understood, there are 
more than enough results anywhere, but no decisive result 
anywhere."32 
A further claim is made that even if the objective truths 
of Christian faith were established as the most secure of all 
human enterprises of knowledge, for a believer, nothing is 
gained, not even in the least, "with regard to the power and 
strength of his faith."33 On the contrary, 
... in this prolix knowledge, in this certainty thatlurks 
at faith's door and craves for it, he is rather in such a 
precarious position that much effort, much fear and 
trembling will be needed lest he fall into temptation 
and confuse faith with knowledge.34 
For Climacus, radically, only in an epistem.ologically im­
perfect world is faith even conceivable (!). 
That is to say, a fundamental deficiency m.arks ~U1y 
positive knowledge. As Climacus says, /Iall of this positive fails 
to express the state of the knowing subject in existence."s'.; 
Speculative, theoretical results are diSingenuous claims of 
inhumanly grasping the whole of reality sub specie aeterni. 
The Recovery ofFinite Human Understanding 
We can legitimately question whether Johannes 
Climacus' appraisal of all sensate, historical, and speculative 
truths is unwarrantedly dismissive, whetherhehastooguickly 
disregarded the substantive contribution which objective truth 
provides.36 What concerns us here, however, is instead what 
place these claim.s occupy in Climacus' broader philosophy. 
While objective reasoning, in matters of objective truth, might 
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yield certain appropriate methods, this approach fails on an 
existential leveL It cannot provide the certainty required for 
concern in one's summum bonum. "Faith does not result from 
straightforward scholarly deliberation .. ." - only the infinite 
inwardness of faith is 1/dialectically adequate" to secure a real 
foothold in true religiousIless.37 
No religious result can ever be reached, if one remains 
in presuppositionless speculation. AsKierkegaard noted in his 
journals, reflection stays only I'the possibility of reflection."38 
But once one has-Climacus would here say through a 'leap' 
inwardly integrated objective results, then doubt inevitably 
arises.39 
Here we can maintain perhaps one of the most sugges­
tive rapprochements between Kierkegaard and later 
hermeneutical thought: an adherence to the so-called 
hermeneutical circle. In Climacus' account, and unlike whathe 
sees Hegel as doing, to acquire knowledge is to take a commit­
ted stance, to be involved, and even personally contribute, to 
thatwhich one desires to know. For a later hermeneutic thinker, 
like Martin Heidegger, and unlike aspects in Hllsserlian phe­
nomenology, when a person attempts to understand anything, 
she likewise cannot remail1.'presuppositionless', or acquire all 
her beliefs in a state of pure detachment. "In interpreting," 
Heidegger explains familiarly, "we do not, so to speak, throw 
a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present at 
hand... In every case this interpretation is grounded in some­
thing we have in advance."40 This proceeding from a pre-pos­
sessedpersonal'fore-understanding' might seem circular, even 
viciously so. But for Heidegger, "what is decisive is not to get 
out of the circle but to come into it in the right way."41 
In the same manner, Kierkegaard would urge us to see 
that the Hegelian system, in claiming to begin 
presuppositionlessly, cannot begin at all: 1/A logical system 
must not poast of an absolute beginning, because such a begin­
ning is just like pure being, a pure chimera.1f42 We must start to 
understand somewhere, and this is through what Climacus 
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calls a personal 'letting go', that is, a 'corning into' the circle of 
human understanding. In other words, to understand, we 
must involve ourselves, must already be implicated in that 
which we desire to know, thus resolving the old Platonic 
paradox in the Meno, of how we can learn anything new at alL 
All understanding undoubtedly depends upon some human 
interpretive framework in which we already operate and live. 
As Alasdair MacIntyre adeptly observes, IIa world of textures, 
shapes, smells, sensations, sound and nothing more invites no 
questions andgives no grounds for furnishing any answers.//43 
And this situatedness of our knowledge can grant us 
only provisional legitimacy for any of our beliefs, making us 
live, in a description that Climacus would undoubtedly en­
dorse, "without the idea of the 'infinite intellect', finality, and 
absolute knowledge ... [where we are called back] to an under­
standing of what itmeans to be finite historical beings who are 
always'on the" yay' andwho must assume personal responsibil­
ity for our decisions and choices."44 Committed existence is a 
constant proceFs of historical becoming, from which dialecti­
cal, and decidedly fallibilistic constant human striving, cannot 
be excluded. 
As neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty, himself sensitive to 
hermeneutical insights,45 would say, what Kierkegaard has 
been calling'approximation-knowledge' is what we as hu­
mans are necessarily left with when we abandon our hope for 
"metaphysical comfort"- when we displace what Rorty him­
self refers to (in quasi-Kierkegaardian fashion) as "the desire 
for objectivity. 1146 Itresults in the situation that "there is always 
room for improved belief, 11 47 that, to use explicit Kiekegaardian 
language, speCUlative results are always approximations, and 
thus unable to bear the weight of one's infinite concern. 
The antithesis to this line of thought is contained in a 
classic statement in modern philosophy, by Rene Descartes. 
Descartes, after subjecting all of his prior beliefs to an unrelent­
ing doubt, proceeded to seek out some indubitable truth, to 
arrive at some fact which was finally secure, entirely immune 
13 RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN FINITUDE 
from further dialectical doubt. He compared his aspiration to 
the Greek thinker 
Archimides, [who] in order that he might draw the 
terrestial globe out of its place, and transport it else­
where, demanded only that one point should be fixed 
and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right 
to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to 
discover one thing only which is certain and indubi­
table.48 
As if addressing Cartesian foundationalism directly, 
Johannes Climacus speaks to this particular speculative ten­
dency that Rorty (as we have already noted) has called our 
desire for "metaphysical comfort." Climacus' response, an 
essentially negative one, is that no such immobilized fulcrum, 
no privileged place by which we can transport the 'terrestial 
globe' out of its place, in fact exists: 
In a human being there is always a desire, at once 
comfortable and concerned, to have something really 
firm and fixed tha tcan exclude the dialectica I, but this 
is cowardliness towards the divine ... even the most 
fixed of all, an infinite negative resolution, which is 
the indi yid ua lily's infinite form of God's being within 
him, becomes promptly dialecticaL As soon as I take 
away the dialectical, I am superstitious and defraud 
God of the moment's strenuous acquisition of what 
was once acquired.49 
For the religious relationship, 11 certainty is impossible for a 
person in a process of becoming, and it is indeed a deception. IIso 
And this is what Johamles Climacus has called "the eternal 
protest against fic Hons" - that we must face up to our historic­
ity, our constant state of ethical striving.5J 
As one 'postmodernist' philosopher has said, radically 
underscoring this hermeneutical recognition of human fini­
tude, the (proto-) deconstructionist and (proto-) hermeneutical 
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insights by renegade thinkers like Kierkegaard must always: 

blow the whistle on the excessively apodictic frame of 
mind endemic to metaphysics and urge in its place a 
sense of raising truth from below, of forging certain 
contigent unities of meaning which may become 
unstuck at any moment, or which may take on an 
unexpected sense at a later date which will lead us to 
revise them radically.52 
From a human stand point, no fixed' center' of know ledge 
exists. We are always denied what deconstructionists have 
called a 'metaphysics of presence', a fullness or totality of 
meaning. In other words, "the subjective existing thinker is 
always just as negative as he is positive, and vice versa/'5S 
claims an anticipatory Johannes Climacus. 
It is only the I superstitious' believer, who, in presumed 
'positivity', /I fancies himself to have a certainty that can be had 
only in infinitude, inwhich, however, he cannot be as anexisting 
person but at which he is constantly striving."54 And in this 
resolution is realized the earlier, promised overcoming of 
paralyzing'objective' skepticism -not through some Cartesian 
foundationalist certitude, butby the existential' coming into' of 
the human hermeneutical circle the right way. 
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